California Appellate Lawyer Blog

In Duncan v. The McCaffrey Group, Inc. (filed October 28, 2011) 2011 DJDAR 15875, plaintiffs bought from defendants residential lots in a tract marketed as Treviso Custom Home Development. Plaintiffs claim they bought in the development, paying premium prices, because of its marketing as an exclusively custom home development; instead, defendants, unbeknownst to plaintiffs, intended to build smaller tract homes on some of the lots .The matter came before the Fresno County Superior Court on defendants' demurrers and motion for summary adjudication. On the issues that are the subject of this appeal, the trial court sustained the demurrers and granted summary adjudication on the basis that the parol evidence rule precluded plaintiffs from establishing facts supportive of their claims. The Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed.

Defendants took the position that plaintiffs' allegations in question could not be considered because they contradicted the terms of the lot sales agreements and the CC&R's that included giving the developer the right to build different types of residences. Under the parole evidence rule, argued defendants, the integrated agreement on each lot was the final expression of the terms of the agreement.

On their causes of actions for unfair competition and false advertising, the plaintiffs successfully argued to the appellate court that these claims did not contain allegations that required proof that would vary, alter or add to the terms of a written agreement. Rather than argue the terms of the agreement, each plaintiff alleged he or she was mislead by and reasonably relied upon false advertising.

Continue reading "Evidence extrinsic to the parties' contract is admissible to prove false advertising" »

"It's the bad economy" has become the all-too-frequent, yet mostly accurate, cry heard when a party is called upon to explain the decrease, or even total loss, in value of a disputed asset. In litigation over community assets in a marital dissolution, this explanation may not suffice, as is emphasized in the recent California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District (Division 3) case of Marriage of Margulis (modification filed Sept. 9, 2011) 2011 DJDAR 13821.

The evidence at trial showed that Elaine Margulis, as the non-managing spouse, had no personal knowledge of the extent of the community property at the time of her separation from Alan Margulis. Evidently, Alan as the spouse who managed the community assets, had at one time prepared a list of assets and their approximate values (investment funds purportedly totaling $787,000). Elaine offered this document into evidence to show that substantial community assets under Allen's control had disappeared between separation and trial. While the trial court admitted this document into evidence, it gave this evidence little or no weight. The court thus found that Elaine had failed to carry her burden of proving the values of these investment account assets.

The Court of Appeal disagreed. It found that the evidence introduced by Elaine satisfied her initial burden of showing that Alan controlled community assets of a certain value. The statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting effectively shifted the burden to Alan to rebut the presumption charging him with the assets listed in this evidence which constituted prima facie evidence of the values stated. (See California Family Code section 721, subdivision (b).) This statute requires the managing spouse to furnish information to the other spouse concerning the disposition of community assets. The trial court here failed to require Alan to trace the missing money to proper expenditures to determine whether he had taken unfair advantaged of her.

While the trial court did find that Alan neglected to maintain proper records, it failed to consider whether Alan had breached additional fiduciary duties that would have allowed Elaine to recover damages under Family Code section 1101, subdivisions (g) and (h) for assets undisclosed or transferred in breach of fiduciary duty.

So it is not enough for a managing spouse to simply say I lost all of that money on bad investments or the investments were victims of the bad economy. The spouse must keep good records of changes in values and details of disposition or else be charged with their prima facie value.

A California Court of Appeal just came down with an interesting case regarding mootness.

In Coalition for a Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (4th Dist. No. E047624, 8/25/11), plaintiff sued the city, Target, and the developer to enjoin its approval of a new shopping center. Plaintiff claimed that the project violated state requirements on affordable housing and on environmental requirements.

The trial court ruled for the City, and plaintiff appealed. During the appeal, however, the project was abandoned - because of litigation between Target and the developer. The City then moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming mootness.

On its face, dismissing for mootness makes sense. No more project to stop, so why bother with plaintiff's appeal, right?

Not so fast, held the Court of Appeal. A dismissal of the appeal constitutes an affirmance of the trial court's ruling. We don't want to do that, because we've never looked at the merits of the appeal. And maybe - just maybe, as the law is not settled on this - "the less-than-fully-litigated judgment might have a preclusive effect on subsequent litigation."

The solution? Reverse because of mootness, with directions to the trial court to dismiss the complaint. That should make everyone happy - or minimally unhappy - given the circumstances.

Pretty clever. Nice to see our appellate courts taking such care on procedural matters.

By: Myron Moskovitz

I have learned that when I buy a cell phone at a discount, conditioned on my entering a service agreement for a defined time, I end up paying the sales tax on the undiscounted price stated for the phone. Plaintiff had this same experience, but was surprised to learn that she could have negotiated for a lesser or no sales tax because under California Code of Regulations, title 18, section 1585, subdivision (b) (3), while the retailer is required to report and pay the full sales tax, it may (rather than must) collect that charge from the consumer.

In Bower v. AT&T Mobility LLC (filed June 29, 2011) 2011 DJDAR 9801, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's sustaining of demurrer without leave to amend in part because plaintiff Bowers failed to show legally cognizable injury. Bowers had claimed reliance upon misleading statements by AT&T that she had no choice but to pay the sales tax on the undiscounted price. While it is true that the retailer must remit the full tax to the state, because the retailer does have a choice to pass the cost on to the consumer, she asserted that she had been denied the opportunity to negotiate the amount of sales tax she had to pay. In her second amended complaint, Bower tried to allege actual loss in citing this lost opportunity; the trial court had found this allegation too "speculative."

The appellate court agreed that the allegations were insufficient to plead the required element of injury in fact as one must do in an action brought under Business & Professions Code sections 17200 or 17500 (unfair business practice or misleading advertising). There was no economic injury because plaintiff could not allege she would not have bought this product but for the misrepresentation and that the product was worth less than represented.

Often in mediations, I state my sympathy to a party claiming to have been wronged, but find it necessary to ask, "But what are your damages?" Many wrongs are very real but are left without a remedy. Some cases like the above are so for lack of standing as a matter of pleading. Others are so because a plaintiff cannot present factual proof of loss. Attorneys are wise to assess damages before even taking a case, no matter how "wrong" the conduct of the prospective defendant.

An appellate court can assist counsel on a discretionary basis by construing appeals from non-appealable orders. It may treat the matter as a writ petition. (Munger v. Gates (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1248, 1254.) It may view them as appeals from existing orders. (Vibert v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1538) It may supply a missing judgment. (Nowlon v. Koram Ins. Center, Inc. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1440-1441.)

But beware. An appellate court's "saving power" is entirely discretionary and case law is replete with California appellate cases expressing weariness with errant counsel. Those cases include one I authored while serving on California's Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, Jordan v. Malone (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 18. In Jordan, plaintiff candidly admitted no formal judgment was entered, but the appellate court should nonetheless construe the trial court's tentative decision as a final judgment. Not a good tactic to admit laziness. And the California Supreme Court has weighed in that the "saving" of an appeal renders jurisdiction "questionable," which should make reliance on an appellate court's generosity to save your appeal one of last resort. (Connolly v. County of Orange (1992), 1 Cal.4th 1105, 1112.)

Assessing an appeal requires deciding whether a case has sufficient merit to warrant the cost of appeal, what issues in particular have reasonable chance of success, and how best to argue your case. For those of us who have been on the other side of the bench, one piece of advice is absolutely essential: if you are the attorney who tried the case and your client approves and can afford it, get some form of assistance early on from experienced appellate counsel. Even very experienced trial counsel can be too close to the trees to see the forest. A review of your pre-trial, post-trial or pre-appeal matter for specific appellate issues or problems may save you from costly (and avoidable) errors.

In my June 2 blog article I discussed some general rules concerning whether a judgment is appealable. Today, the focus is on these two specific types of orders that have some tricky applications.

The majority view is that discovery sanctions, regardless of amount, are not directly appealable, but are reviewable only on appeal after final judgment or on writ petition. (Ballard v. Taylor (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1736, 1739.) There is however a minority of cases that construe Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 (a) (11) and (12), the general sanctions statute, to apply to all sanctions including matters of discovery and thus allow direct appeal for those sanction orders exceeding $5,000. ( See, for example, Green v. Amante (1992) 3 Cal.4th 684, 690.)

In addition to some conflict in the law, an exception to the rule that a discovery sanction is not immediately appealable also exists. If a party's former attorney or an attorney of a party no longer participating in the litigation incurred the sanction order the order is deemed final as to the attorney who is no longer participating, an analysis akin to the "final as to a party" exception. (Barton v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1561.) Thus, counsel who believe they or their client have been improperly sanctioned and plan to appeal a sanction order must be especially diligent in reviewing appeal deadlines as the litigation progresses.

Continue reading "More on the question of whether an order is appealable: discovery sanctions and defaults" »

Protecting the environment has become a noteworthy objective for conscientious consumers. Not surprisingly, commercial producers have tapped into this market in labeling products. What does such labeling actually tell a consumer about the product? One such consumer, Ayana Hill, thought the green drop on the label of Fiji bottled water meant the product was "environmentally superior" and "endorsed by an environmental organization." She bought the product twice a week starting in 2008 paying about 15% more than for other bottled water; she would not have bought Fiji water had she known the green drop was the company's own creation and not an endorsement of the product by a neutral organization that the product was environmentally superior. She further alleged the product in fact caused no less environmental damage than its competitors did.

In Hill v. Roll International Corp. (filed May 26, 2011) 2011 DJDAR 7641, the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the judgment of dismissal on sustaining of demurrer to plaintiff Hill's complaint that included allegations of violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Law (FAL) (Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq. and 17500, et seq., respectively), Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civil Code section 1750 et seq.) and common law fraud. The appellate court found that no reasonable consumer would be misled to think that the green drop represented the endorsement of a separate organization or that the product was environmentally superior.

Significant to the court's analysis was the Federal Trade Commission guides that have been incorporated by the California Legislature into the statutory definition of environmental marketing claims. (See Business & Professions Code section 17580.5, subdivision (a).) Those guides require substantiation that an express or implied claim conveys to a reasonable consumer an objective quality, feature, or attribute of the product. Hill's subjective beliefs alone do not satisfy this requirement. Moreover, the context of the green-drop symbol indicates that it bears no name or recognized group logo, no trademark, and no indication other than it is a symbol of Fiji water.

As the trial court proceedings here terminated at the pleading stage, the court was satisfied that even assuming everything Hill alleged was true, she still could not prevail. So UCL and FAL plaintiff attorneys need to pay close attention that their pleadings adequately allege that asserted misrepresentations are such that the typical, reasonable consumer would be mislead, not just that the named plaintiff was mislead. And of course, be prepared to prove that. The standard is that of an "ordinary consumer within the larger population." (Lavie v.Procter & Gamble Co. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 496, 510.)

CarMax instituted a pay plan for its sales consultants designed to avoid an incentive for salespersons to push customers to higher-priced vehicles. Rather than include in the salesperson's compensation package a percentage of the person's total dollars of sales, it would pay the employee a fixed payment for each vehicle sold. California Labor Code section 1194 requires employers to pay overtime; there is however an exemption if such a salesperson earns more than one-and-one-half times the minimum wage and "commissions" constitute more than one-half of the person's compensation.

In Areso v. CarMax, Inc (filed May 23, 2011) 2011 DJDAR 7271, plaintiff filed a class action primarily alleging that defendant failed to pay overtime to sales consultants. Her total pay and total per-car compensation (at the rate of $154 per car sold) exceeded the threshold requirements of the commissioned sales exemptions if her per-car compensation constituted a "commission." She argued this was not a commission. Defendant claimed it was, and moved for summary adjudication of this particular cause of action accordingly. The trial court granted the motion and the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed.

Because the summary adjudication disposed of only the first of six causes of action, the Court of Appeal first addressed the issue of appealability. (See my discussion in June 2 blog.) The second cause of action had previously been dismissed with prejudice, however the remaining ones were dismissed at plaintiff's request without prejudice. The court noted that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice generally is not a final judgment appealable on the merits, however, if the remaining causes of action are purely ancillary, the matter is appealable. Here one of the remaining causes of actions was not ancillary, but because the court found plaintiff's appellate brief had effectively waived her right to proceed on that action, the court cured the issue of a remaining cause of action by exercising its discretion to amend the judgment to reflect that the remaining cause of action was dismissed with prejudice.

Continue reading "Uniform Payment for Each Car Sold Constitutes "Commission" in Determining Car- Dealer Employee is Exempt from Overtime Pay " »

California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 provides the basic rules of what constitutes an appealable order. In this blog article, I wish to discuss some of the subtleties in making that determination.

Often attorneys attempt to appeal a case that gets dismissed as taken from a nonappealable judgment because of violation of the "One Final Judgment Rule." As the appellate court stated in Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 186 Cal.App. 3d 959, at 966-967: "[P]iecemeal disposition and multiple appeals tend to be oppressive and costly." The objective here in strictly enforcing this rule is to avoid a multiplicity of appeals, reduce uncertainty and trial court delays, not allow an early appeal to be obviated by a later trial court ruling, and enable a complete adjudication that would allow specific instructions for further proceedings if necessary on remand.

A problem in application, however, is that the line is not always clear as to whether there is an issue left for further consideration by the trial court. On the one hand it might be said that if all that is left is compliance with the decree in question, the decree is final. On the other hand, if any judicial action by the trial court is necessary to an ultimate determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is not final. In short, what is determinative is substance rather than labels.

Continue reading "How Does One Determine Whether a Court Order or Judgment Is Appealable?" »

Where a law firm is a prevailing party under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, may it recover attorney fees generated on the case by an associate of the firm? This question is a variant of that posed in my last blog article (see May 23rd discussion of the recent Richards case). In Carpenter & Zuckerman v. Cohen (Filed May 10,2011) 2011 DJDAR 6665, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, answered no.

The Carpenter & Zuckerman law firm (C & Z) prevailed, under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, on a cross-complaint brought against it by Cohen, including the dismissal of an appeal from its trial court victory. As a part of its memorandum of cost, C & K requested attorneys fees as are authorized to the prevailing party on an Anti-SLAPP motion to strike an as ordered by the court. C & K associate attorney Candice Klein declared she had been "retained" by C & K as an independent contractor to represent the firm in its appeal of the order to strike; that she was entitled to charge the firm for her services in the form of a contingency fee that would entitle her to any attorney fees awarded; her fee request was for a lodestar hourly amount of approximately $22,000 multiplied by 1.5 for a total attorney fees claim of about $33,000.
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Cohen brought a motion to tax costs which was granted by the trial court, which found that C & K was not entitled to recover attorney fees because C & K essentially represented itself. The appellate court affirmed. Like the appellate court in Richards, the Carpenter court analogously relied on Trope v. Katz, the California Supreme Court's analysis there under the contractual/prevailing party provisions of Civil Code section 1717. The appellate court here did not buy C & K's argument that attorney Klein's representation of C & K was not the equivalent of self-representation. The trial court made a factual finding that Klein was acting as an associate, not as an independent contractor as she had declared. The firm was being sued not based on any particular member's personal matter or personal liability, which might have made a difference.

This opinion illustrates how important factual findings of the trial court are to the appellate resolution of an issue. There need only be substantial evidence to support that factual finding. Here, the trial court determined that Klein's characterization of her work on this case as an independent contractor was belied by the fact of her employment as a C & K associate attorney. As the saying goes, ones case is only as good as its facts.

Today, I will continue on the subject of attorney fees. This blog article and the next one will discuss recoverability of attorney fees: May attorneys representing themselves recover contractual attorney fees?

Licensed attorneys Linda and Thomas Richards, as owners of a lodge, were sued for the solo-car traffic death of a patron of the lodge's bar. The Richardses tendered defense of the case to Sequoia Insurance Company, which carried a general liability policy. Sequoia suggested it could not respond quickly enough to the tender, so the Richardses should go ahead and hire counsel to commence representation; Sequoia promised to reimburse such defense costs should it decide to accept the defense. Attorney Charter agreed to represent them without a retainer, with the Richardses doing the "majority" of the legal research and drafting in support of their attorney.

Subsequently, Sequoia agreed to assume the defense and pay fees owed to Charter and other attorneys, but denied the Richardses claim for $30,000 for 60 hours of legal work they said they personally provided. After Sequoia settled the underlying case, the Richardses sued Sequoia for breach of contract in Richards v. Sequoia Insurance Company (Filed April 28, 2011) 2011 DJDAR 6729. After the Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed.

Sequoia relied upon the California Supreme Court case of Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274 which states that attorneys acting in propria persona in suing for breach of a contract containing a prevailing attorney fees provision cannot recover for the value of their services in successfully prosecuting the action. But the Trope case is different than this case because it is based on California Civil Code section 1717's provision that permits the prevailing party the award of attorney fees reasonably incurred to enforce that contract in the present case. Here, the Richardses are seeking in the instant action their fees in the previous case that the insurance company was to defend under the contract of insurance. The appellate court determined that, while Trope is not dispositive, it aids the present analysis in deciding what constitutes reasonable attorney fees incurred. Incur means to become obligated to pay. Representing oneself does not cause the party to become obligated to pay anyone anything for that work performed.

The appellate court could have just as easily reached the same conclusion by simply saying the Richardses were represented by counsel of record whose fees they incurred were paid for by the insurance company; this payment discharged the company's obligation to pay. Perhaps respondents did not argue this point. I do tend to think that appellate courts would rather cite supreme court authority as a sounder basis to reach a conclusion, even if it is not directly on point.

Lemmer v. Charney (Filed May 5, 2011) 2011 DJDAR 6494 involved an attorney suing his former client for fraud and intentional interference with prospective advantage. The claim was based on the attorney's detrimental reliance on the client's fraudulent promise that the case would go to trial or settlement in exchange for the attorney agreeing to a contingency fee. The Los Angeles Superior Court sustained the client's demurrer to the first amended complaint. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed.

Attorney Lemmer had represented Charney in a lawsuit against his former employer, Teleflora, regarding Charney's employment. Initially the fee arrangement was based on an hourly rate. After Teleflora cross-complained, Charney asked to change the arrangement to a contingency fee; thinking Charney had a good case, Lemmer agreed, conditioned on Charney's promise to take the case to trial or settlement to ensure payment for legal representation.

Less than a month before trial, Charney expressed to Lemmer his fear of going to trial because he knew Telefloral was extremely litigious, vindictive and would drag this case out on appeal even if it lost at trial. Lemmer advised the case was worth several hundred thousand dollars, which boded well for Charney's recovery, in addition to attorney fees for Lemmer. Charney and his wife responded that Lemmer must do as they instruct nonetheless. Teleflora offered a "walk away" settlement which was accepted, ending the case. According to Lemmer, he was never paid a "reasonable fee for services rendered."

Continue reading "Attorney Contracted on Contingency Fee May Not Recover for Client's Refusal to Proceed to Trial" »

As the saying goes, "Dog is man's best friend." We all love our pets. My wife and I are "cat people" and treat our cats as part of the family. Most communities have ordinances and regulations of various sorts concerning these furry friends. Concerned Dog Owners of California v. City of Los Angeles (Filed April 29, 2011) 2011 DJDAR 6105 raises the issue of the extent of government police power that may be constitutionally exercised in requiring resident-owners to spay or neuter their pets.

The Los Angeles ordinance requirement included certain exceptions: for breeders, and owners of work/rescue type dogs and those animals who would be medically endangered by the procedure. Plaintiffs' challenge of the ordinance failed in the trial court. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed.

Plaintiffs' constitutional argument focused on federal First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. (They also unsuccessfully argued equal protection, due process and California constitutional liberties.) They contended the ordinance amounted to a content-based restriction on protected speech by forcing those who did not want to spay or neuter their pets to purchase a breeder permit. Such categorization, they said, bore a negative stigma, with which they did not want to be associated, and forced the payment of a "compelled subsidy." The appellate court disagreed: the ordinance's only mandatory requirement is to spay or neuter ones pet, not to pay a government fee or require a certain association. There is nothing expressive about this that would even bring this exercise of authority for the public good of controlling the municipal animal population within the First Amendment.

It is not for me to speculate what might have motivated the plaintiffs in this case to challenge the ordinance. I imagine they could very sincerely believe that they were protecting the health of their pets, although the ordinance did have a medical endangerment exemption. But they do seem at odds with the animal rights movement. Long-time television personality Bob Barker, a strong supporter of and national spokesperson for animal rights used to end every show of The Price is Right with the phrase: "Help control the pet population. Have your pets spayed or neutered." (His successor on the show, Drew Carey, continues to use this signature sign-off.) I suppose the plaintiffs were not so much offended by the philosophy of controlling the pet population as they were by the fact that government was requiring them to do so.

When a party requests that a court rule on a particular matter, a primary concern is what standard or test will apply. Put a different way, what must a party prove in order to prevail? However, once the proper test is stated, the court may still end up committing error by not properly applying it to the case at hand. That is what happened in F.T. v. L.J. (filed March 8, 2011, certified for publication on April 6, 2011) 2011 DJDAR 5001.

Father and Mother have joint legal custody of Child, Father having physical custody pursuant to temporary (not final) orders. The parties both live in San Diego. Desiring to move to the State of Washington, Father makes a motion to move there taking Child along with him. Purporting to apply the test of "the best interest[s] of [Child]," the trial court denied Father's request to move. Father appeals claiming primarily that he had a presumptive right to move and Mother did not overcome this right by showing child would suffer detriment. While it disagreed with these assertions, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed and remanded the matter because the trial court did not properly apply the best-interests test.

The F.T. appellate court found three significant problems with the trial court's ruling. First, the trial court avoided the ultimate question of whether a change in physical custody to Mother would be in Child's best interests were Father to move to Washington by assuming Father would not move; the question is what would be the custody arrangement, not whether the parent is permitted to move. Second, the court improperly placed an implied burden on Father when it stated in its order that the reason for his move was to "join a new wife," something that was not "sufficiently necessary;" this is contrary to the California Supreme Court ruling in In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25 that a moving custodial parent is not required to show necessity. And third, the trial court unduly emphasized the probability that such a move could be detrimental to Child's relationship with Mother; such is a factor, but not to the exclusion of others.

The above-cited Burgess case is a case ingrained in my memory. While serving on the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, I wrote an appellate opinion in that case taking the position that the parent with temporary physical custody of children should not be required to prove necessity in order to retain custody upon moving away to a different city. I opined the proper test remained the best-interests test. However, being in the minority of the three justices on the panel, my opinion was in dissent. It was the only time in my judicial career that I wrote a dissenting opinion that essentially became the opinion of the Supreme Court, a seminal family law opinion at that.

While this blog's primary focus is to comment on recent appellate opinions, trial attorneys may want to read it not just to keep current on some new cases, but also to help in trial strategy. You may ask: how does an appellate perspective help during trial? Quite simply, a hard earned victory at trial will be all for naught if it is reversed on appeal. I hope to write more specifically on this in future blogs.

For the trial attorney who has completed a trial with less-than-satisfactory results, assessing an appeal requires deciding whether a case has sufficient merit to warrant the cost of appeal, what issues in particular have reasonable chance of success, and how best to argue your case. For those of us who have been on the other side of the bench, one piece of advice is absolutely essential: if you are the attorney who tried the case and your client approves and can afford it, get some form of assistance early on from experienced appellate counsel. Even very experienced trial counsel can be too close to the trees to see the forest.

Continue reading "Winning at Trial and On Appeal: Professor Myron Moskovitz Joins the Dowling Aaron Incorporated Team" »