"This case has a somewhat tortuous procedural history." With this introductory comment, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, clues the reader in on what lies ahead in its opinion of Joaquin v. City of Los Angeles (filed January 23, 2012) 2012 DJDAR 939. And the facts are as tortuous as the procedural history. After briefly reviewing the facts and proceedings, I will share some thoughts on the reasoning that gets the court to its reversal (without remand) of the jury's $2.1 million verdict awarded Joaquin.
Richard Joaquin is a LAPD police officer who at times worked under Sergeant James Sands. A dispute arose between Joaquin and Sands, acting as Joaquin's watch commander, as to whether Joaquin had completed his work shift. Sands eventually directed disciplinary measures. Joaquin perceived Sands' actions as retaliation against Joaquin's rebuff of what Joaquin claimed were Sands sexual advances. Internal Affairs (IA) investigations found Joaquin's allegations unfounded.
Sands then lodged with IA his own complaint against Joaquin (for making false statements), resulting in proceedings before the Board of Rights, which put Joaquin's promotion to sergeant on hold.and temporarily relieved him of his duties. The Board found Joaquin guilty of misconduct concluding he retaliated against Sands by initiating a false complaint, resulting in 2006 in Joaquin's termination. As a result of writ proceedings, Joaquin succeeded in gaining reinstatement in 2009.
Back in 2006, Joaquin filed this lawsuit for wrongful termination in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. The above jury verdict was returned after trial in Los Angeles Superior Court in 2010. In reversing the trial court judgment, the appellate court found that Joaquin had failed to present any substantial evidence supporting retaliatory intent. It found no evidence that Sands played a role in the IA investigation; nor was there any evidence that IA or the Board of Rights harbored the intent to retaliate against Joaquin. The court concludes, "in view of the scant evidence presented to the jury about the Board of Rights proceedings, the jury was not in a position to determine whether under all of the circumstances, the Board of Rights credibility determinations were reasonable." While City did not raise the issue of instructional error (and probably failed to raise that issue in the trial court as well), the Court of Appeal notes that "under the unique facts of the present case," the instructions inadequately advised the jurors concerning retaliatory intent.
I do not wish to suggest that the court reached the wrong result; and, as a practical matter, long after he filed this action, Joaquin apparently did get his job back. This case presented the appellate panel with a difficult factual scenario and procedural history. I am concerned that based upon this convolution before it, the court may find its published holding and dicta on these very unique facts being misapplied in future cases. One might take the court's comments to mean that the action of a neutral board affirming an employer's termination of an employee can insulate the employee's supervisor's pretextual conduct and retaliatory intent. One might also confuse the court's suggestion that reasonable credibility determinations defeat Joaquin's case here as meaning that a substantial-evidence review acts to weigh the evidence, rather than to give deference to any substantial evidence that the party prevailing below presented. .
Perhaps this is the type of case that years ago led my law professors to repeat the old adage: "Bad facts make bad law."
